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1Abstract:
Why did England industrialize ﬁrst? And why was Europe ahead of the rest of the
world? Uniﬁed growth theory in the tradition of Galor-Weil (2000) and Galor-Moav
(2002) captures the key features of the transition from stagnation to growth over time.
Yet we know remarkably little about why industrialization occurred so much earlier
in some parts of the world than in others. To answer this question, we present a prob-
abilistic two-sector model where the initial escape from Malthusian constraints de-
pendsoncapitaldeepeningandtheuseofmoredifferentiatedcapitalinputs. Weather-
induced shocks to agricultural productivity cause changes in prices and quantities,
and affect wages. In a standard model with capital externalities, these ﬂuctuations
interact with the demographic regime and affect the speed of growth. Our model is
calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1700 and the
observed transition until 1850. We capture one of the key features of the British In-
dustrial Revolution emphasized by economic historians – slow growth of output and
productivity. The paper explores one additional aspect of inequality in the transition
to the Post-Malthusian economy – the availability of nutrition for poorer segments of
society. We examine the inﬂuence of redistributive institutions such as the Old Poor
Law, and ﬁnd they were not decisive in fostering industrialization. Simulations using
parameter values for other countries show that Britain’s early escape was only partly
due to chance. France could have attained a greater workforce in manufacturing than
Britain, but the probability was less than 30 percent. Contrary to recent claims in the
literature, 18th century China had only a minimal chance to escape from Malthusian
constraints.
JEL: E27, N13, N33, O14, O41
Keywords: Industrial Revolution, Uniﬁed Growth Theory, Endogenous Growth, Transition,
Calibration, British Economic Growth before 1850.
21 Introduction
Britain was the ﬁrst country to break free from Malthusian constraints, with population size and
living standards starting to grow in tandem after 1750 [Crafts (1985), Wrigley (1983)]. In many
parts of the world, however, growth rates of per capita income took a long time to accelerate.
Eventually, more and more countries industrialized, ﬁrst in Europe and North America, and from
the 20th century onwards in other areas of the globe. The relative size of economies, the onset of
the demographic transition, and living standards of citizens are still profoundly inﬂuenced by the
timing of Industrial Revolutions around the globe [Galor and Mountford (2003)] – with dramatic
consequences for the economic and political history of the world that are still felt today.
Why did some countries industrialize so much earlier than others? Uniﬁed growth theory
[Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), Jones (2001)] offers a consistent explanation
for the transition from century-long Malthusian stagnation to rapid growth. What is missing is a
better understanding of why some countries overcame stagnation at radically different points in
time. The question is almost as old as industrialization itself. Economic historians have stressed a
long list of factors, ranging from the property rights regime to the land tenure system, that might
have favored Britain [Landes 1999]. Galor (2005) argues that geographical factors and historical
accident interacted to delay or accelerate the timing of the ”Great Escape”, and that ”variations in
institutional, demographic, and cultural factors, trade patterns, colonial status, and public policy”
may have played a role. This paper aims to provide a systematic answer to the questions “Why
England?” and “Why Europe?” In doing so, it offers clear quantitative evidence on the role of
starting conditions and the nature of constraints that delayed industrialization for centuries in
many parts of the world.
In our model, chance can play an important role. Industrialization is treated as the result
of a probabilistic process. During the late medieval and early modern period, sustained expan-
sions occurred in many countries [Braudel 1973]. Yet most of these growth episodes sooner or
later ground to a halt. Some advanced economies (such as the Italian Republics) went into de-
cline, while countries like the Netherlands stagnated at high income levels. This is why economic
historians have often been sceptical of industrialization theories where the ﬁnal outcome is pre-
determined [Clark (2003), Mokyr and Voth (2007)]. What explains these starts and stops? And
could other countries have succeeded before Britain? Crafts (1977) argued that accidental factors,
and not systematic advantages, may have been crucial – that France, for example, could have
easily industrialized ﬁrst had it not been for a number of random factors. To examine the determi-
nants of early economic development, this paper develops a simple stochastic model of the ﬁrst
Industrial Revolution – the transition from the Malthusian to the post-Malthusian regime, in the
3terminology of uniﬁed growth theory. In the spirit of Stokey (2001), our model is then calibrated
with eighteenth-century English data. We ﬁnd that chance played a role in the timing and speed
of Britain’s initial surge – it’s actual performance was at the upper end of the expected range of
outcomes in our model. By altering the parameters of the calibrated model, we derive probabili-
ties of the escape in other parts of the world. France could have experienced substantial growth,
based on our model, but the manufacturing employment in 1850 is lower than in Britain in most
of our simulations.
As emphasized by Galor and Moav (2004), physical accumulation is crucial for the ﬁrst tran-
sition. This is reﬂected in our model, which emphasizes TFP advances as a result of growing
capital inputs. The key factors inﬂuencing industrialization probabilities in our model are starting
incomes, the nature of shocks, inequality, and the demographic regime. Galor and Moav (2004)
argue that inequality should be beneﬁcial for industrialization in its initial stages, when physical
capital is crucial; during the second transition to self-sustaining growth, human capital becomes a
key input, and inequality is harmful. We add another dimension emphasized by Fogel (1993). As
many as 20 percent of the population in 18th century France possibly did not receive enough food
toworkformorethanafewhoursaday. Also, wheninequalitywastoogreatpriortotheIndustrial
Revolution, crisis mortality could be high. This undermines growth by reducing capital stock and
the speed of productivity advance. We conclude that inequality is only beneﬁcial via the savings
channel if the population is sufﬁciently well-fed to avoid famines and chronic undernutrition.
Our work is related to three bodies of literature. Economic historians have sometimes been
sceptical of endogenous growth models.1 Crafts (1995) rejected endogenous growth models prin-
cipally because they had little to say about the different speed industrialization in England and
France. Uniﬁed growth theory has made considerable progress in bridging the gap between the-
ory and historical facts. We therefore take the uniﬁed growth models by Galor and Moav (2002),
Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), K¨ ogel and Prskawetz (2001) and Cervellati and Sunde
(2005) as our starting point. Our model focuses on what Galor et al. call the ﬁrst of two crucial
transitions – the one from Malthusian to a post-Malthusian world, when population pressure no
longer determines wages (but before human capital becomes crucial). In the vein of these models,
demographic feedback and physical capital accumulation are important for the initial escape from
stagnation. While papers in the Galor-Weil tradition focus on fertility limitation after the ﬁrst
transition, we emphasize the importance of fertility behavior for starting conditions in Europe (as
in the work of Wrigley (1990), inter alia).
A second set of related papers emphasizes technology adoption. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny
1Voth (2003) concluded that ”the Industrial Revolution in most growth models shares few similarities with the eco-
nomic events unfolding in England in the 18th century”.
4(1989b) argue that bigger markets and lower inequality facilitate the the use of new technolo-
gies when ﬁxed costs are substantial. The technological history of the First Industrial Revolution
only offers qualiﬁed support for the importance of ﬁxed costs and indivisibilities were important.
Instead, we employ an externality to capital use that is based on the ﬁndings of technological
historians (Mokyr 1990). As in K¨ ogel and Prskawetz (2001), we emphasize the importance of
shocks to agriculture in generating industrial growth – an approach that goes back in economic
history to Gilboy (1932). Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) observe that volatility in poor economies
is high. New technologies represent high risk, high return investment. Because of indivisibilities,
only richer and larger countries undertake them. A run of ”good years” increases the probabil-
ity of switching to high-productivity projects. In our model, stochastic income ﬂuctuations and
starting per capita income play because they increase the scope for the capital externality to work.
Our paper also relates to the evolving literature on income distribution, inequality, and economic
development (Galor and Moav 2004).2 Zweim¨ uller (2000) shows how, in an endogenous growth
model, redistribution can be growth-enhancing, while Matsuyama (2002) demonstrates how de-
velopment depends on the exact shape of the income distribution.
The third body of literature uses calibrations and simulation methods to shed new light on
the industrialization process. Stokey (2001) was amongst the ﬁrst to employ calibrations for the
Industrial Revolution. She concludes that foreign trade and technological change in manufac-
turing were equally important for growth, but that improvements in energy production mattered
less. Harley and Crafts (2000) examine the importance of broad-based technological change in
a CGE model, and conclude that slow, sector-speciﬁc improvements in TFP are compatible with
the observed pattern of trade. Lagerl¨ of (2003) uses a probabilistic model where mortality ﬂuc-
tuations – epidemics – eventually lead to a transition to self-sustaining growth. Lagerl¨ of (2006)
simulates the Galor-Weil model, and ﬁnds that it can replicate most of the important features in
the transition from stagnation to growth. Our approach differs from the Stokey approach in that it
uses a more explicit model of productivity change. We combine the calibration exercise with the
probabilistic models in the spirit of Lagerl¨ of (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the historical context and motivation for
the paper. It brieﬂy highlights where existing uniﬁed growth models are in conﬂict with the histor-
ical record, and sets out the basic elements of our story. Section III presents the model, explaining
the role of demographic factors and the productivity beneﬁts of differentiated intermediate goods.
In the next part, we calibrate the model and derive comparative industrialization probabilities for
Britain, France, and China. Section V concludes.
2For a recent cross-country study, see Forbes 2000.
52 Historical background and motivation
We focus on three features of the First Industrial Revolution – the slow, gradual nature of pro-
ductivity growth and structural change, the role of inequality, and the nature of technological
advances. Research in economic history over the last three decades has emphasized the slow and
gradual nature of economic and structural change after 1750. Where once scholars argued for a
few decades during which the transition to rapid growth occurred, a much more gradualist ortho-
doxy has taken hold [Crafts and Harley (1992), Antras and Voth (2001)]. As table 1 shows, total
factor productivity growth rates were barely higher after 1750 than before. What is remarkable
abouttheperiodafter1750inBritainisnotoutputgrowthorTFPperformanceassuch, butthefact
that accelerated population growth coincided with stagnant or slowly growing wages and output
per head [Mokyr (1999)] – which makes the term “post-Malthusian” [Galor (2005)] particularly
apt. During the period, and in line with uniﬁed growth theory, investment rates increased from
about 7% of GDP in 1760 to 14% in 1840 [Feinstein (1978), Crafts (1985)].
Table 1: Output and Productivity Growth during the Industrial Revolution
(percent per annum) Feinstein Crafts Crafts and Harley Antras and Voth
(1981) (1985) (1992) (2003)
Output
1760-1800 1.1 1 1
1801-1831 2.7 2 1.9
1831-60 2.5 2.5 2.5
Productivity
1760-1800 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.27
1801-1831 1.3 0.7 0.35 0.54
1831-1860 0.8 1 0.8 0.33
One important implication of the gradualist school of thought is that per capita living stan-
dards in Britain must have been quite high by 1750 already. This highlights the importance of
starting conditions. One important factor was the nature of its demographic regime. As Wrigley
and Schoﬁeld (1982, 1997) have argued, social and cultural norms limited fertility in early mod-
ern England in a way that few other societies did. This led to higher per capita incomes. England
practiced an extreme form of the ‘European marriage pattern’ – West of a line from St. Peters-
burg to Triest, age at ﬁrst marriage for women was determined by socioeconomic conditions,
not age at ﬁrst menarche. This stabilized per capita living standards and avoided the waste of
6resources and human lives resulting from Malthus’ ‘positive’ check, when population declines
through widespread starvation. Within the European context, England was characterized by a
low-pressure demographic regime – negative shocks to income were mainly absorbed by falls in
fertility rather than increases in mortality [Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981); Wrigley et al. (1997)].
Both the higher level of per capita income produced by this demographic regime, and the way in
which it was achieved, play a crucial role in our model.
Second, Britain was a highly unequal society in the 17th and 18th century [Lindert and
Williamson (1982), Lindert (2000)]. Nonetheless, average British standards of consumption were
relatively high compared to French ones, with a markedly higher minimum level of consumption.
Fogel (1993) estimated that as a result of higher inequality and lower per capita output, the bottom
20-30% of the French population did not receive enough food to perform more than a few hours
of work. This was partly a result of higher productivity overall – Fogel calculates that the British
consumed some 17 percent more calories than their French counterparts. Yet the crucial factor
may have been support for the poorer parts of society. The Old Poor Law was an unusually gen-
erous form of redistribution. At its peak, transfers amounted to 2.5% of British GDP, and more
than 11% of the population received some form of relief. This may also have had indirect effects
for the wages of those who were not recipients, by reducing competition in the labor market and
raising the aggregate wage bill [Boyer 1990]. Mokyr (2002) calculates that at its peak, when the
system allocated 2 percent of GDP, it may have boosted average incomes of the bottom 40 percent
of society by 14 to 25 percent. This ensured that in England, most individuals were sufﬁciently
well-fed to work. It may have also stabilized consumer demand for industrial products. Even
during the 1790s, when food prices were high, up to 30% of working class budgets continued
to be spent on non-food items (with 6% going on clothing). With most of the goods produced
by the nascent modern sector having high income elasticities of demand (in excess of 2.3), even
modest gains in real wages in the later stages of the Industrial Revolution could translate into
rapidly growing purchases of manufacturing goods. Finally, because of the large absolute value
of the own-price elasticity of non-food spending (of –1.8 amongst the English poor), productivity
increases and subsequent price reductions facilitated the growth of the modern sector [Horrell
(1996)].
Thethirdelement inourstory emphasizestherelativeimportanceof innovationvs. inventions.
Traditionally, economic historians in the tradition of North and Thomas (1973) have emphasized
the importance of property rights, especially the patent system. In this view, as the security
of property rights improved after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, more inventive activity took
place. Technological change accelerated. The problem with this interpretation is that intellec-
tual property rights were poorly protected before the 19th century in England, that few inven-
7tors received substantial material rewards, that the role of traditional (“feudal”) forms of reward
like grants from Parliament dominated beneﬁts from patents, and that non-monetary incentives
and chance seem to have played an extraordinarily large part in many of the key breakthroughs
(Mokyr 1993). Most of the technologies that made Britain great in 1850 were already know a
century before. As Mokyr (1990, 2003) has emphasized, the crucial breakthroughs did not take
the shape of blueprints or ideas. Instead, a stream of microinventions gave the First Industrial
Nation its edge:
”In Britain, [...] the private sector on its own generated the technological breakthroughs and,
more importantly, adapted and improved these breakthroughs through a continuous stream of
small, anonymous microinventions which cumulatively accounted for the gains in productivity.”
(Mokyr 1990)
New ways of adapting and making useful existing technologies were crucial. The Watt steam
engine was but a variation of the Newcomen design. Many productivity advances were embodied
in better pieces of capital equipment (Mokyr 1990). What made these advances possible was not a
small group of heroic inventors but a small labor aristocracy of highly skilled craftsmen, perhaps
no more than 5 percent of the workforce overall (Mokyr and Voth 2007). These glass-cutters,
instrument makers, and specialists in ﬁne mechanics were crucial in turning ideas into working
prototypes, or existing machines into reliable capital equipment.
Industrialization occurs in our model in the following way: Incomes ﬂuctuate around their
long-run trend, pinned down by the demographic regime in the pre-industrial era. Technology
improves but slowly through the use of capital itself – the more manufacturing activity there is,
the more scope there is for improving and reﬁning existing designs. The higher pre-industrial
incomes, the greater the chance that a positive, persistent shock leads to a large increase in manu-
facturing output. The higher manufacturing output, the more capital-intensive production overall
becomes – and the greater the scope for an acceleration of productivity growth because of growing
differentiation of capital inputs. Population grows in response to higher wages; positive shocks
to income add to demographic pressures, but also increase the scope for the capital externality
to work. Crucially, because of fertility limitation, Europe’s birth rates never outpace the rate of
capital accumulation. We argue that England in particular (and Europe in general) had a higher
chance to undergo a transition because of the high initial starting incomes, bolstered by a generous
welfare system and a favorable demographic regime.
For our argument to hold, England had to be ahead of the rest of Europe – and Europe
markedly ahead of the rest of the world – in terms of per capita income. This is not accepted
with unanimity. Pomeranz (2000) argues that, in the Yankzi region in China, living standards
were broadly similar with the most advanced regions in Europe, and that the ”great divergence”
8between Asia and Europe was a result of industrialization. Broadberry and Gupta (2005a) have
recently shown that Pomeranz’s claims, even for the Yankzi area, are probably exaggerated. Allen
(2005) ﬁnds that because of low rice and grain prices, the standard of living in Asia and Europe
was broadly similar. However, money wages were markedly lower, and the relative price of man-
ufacturing goods much higher. This is compatible with our interpretation, since it hinges on the
purchasing power of income not dedicated to food.
3 The Model
This section sets out the basic setup of our model. The economy is composed of a continuum of
N identical, inﬁnitely-lived individuals that work, consume, invest, and procreate. Population N
grows by gb(¢) at the end of a period, a birth-function depending on consumption. In every period
the economy produces two types of consumption goods: food and manufacturing products – and
investment goods in the form of capital varieties. Output is produced using land, labor, and the
accumulatedstockofcapitalvarieties. Consumers’preferencesarenon-homothetic: Representing
Engel’s law, the share of manufacturing expenditures grows with income. Below, we describe
each of these elements of our model in turn.
3.1 Consumers
Individuals supply one unit of labor in every period. They use their income for investment, and
to consume an agricultural good (cA) and a manufactured good (cM). Consumers maximize their
expected life-time utility in a two-stage decision. In an inter-temporal optimization problem, they
decide upon their expenditure in a given period t, et. In the second stage, the intra-temporal
optimization, the representative individual takes et as given and maximizes instantaneous utility.
We consider the second stage ﬁrst. The corresponding budget constraint is cA;t +pM;tcM;t · et,
wherepM;t isthepriceofamanufacturedgood. Agriculturalgoodsserveasthenumeraire. Before
they begin to demand manufactured goods, individuals need to consume a minimum quantity of
food, c. Instantaneous preferences take the Stone-Geary form:
u(cA;cM) = (cA ¡ c)®c
1¡®
M (1)
Given et, consumers maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint. This yields the following
equation for the expenditure share on agricultural products:
cA;t
et






9In a poor economy, where income is just enough to ensure subsistence consumption c, all ex-
penditure goes to food. As people become richer and et grows, the share of spending on food
falls, in line with Engel’s law. For very high levels of expenditure, c=et converges to zero and the
agricultural expenditure share converges to ®, which can thus be considered the food expenditure
share in a rich economy.
We now turn to the inter-temporal optimization problem. First, we derive the indirect utility
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1¡® (et ¡ c) (3)
We use this result to set up the inter-temporal optimization problem. In each period t, house-











s.t. gb;tkt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + 1
pK;t(yt ¡ et)
yt = wt + rL;tl + RK;tpK;tkt
where yt, et, kt, and l are per-capita income, expenditure, capital, and land, respectively, and pK;t
is the price of capital.3 Factor returns are the gross capital interest rate RK, wage w, and the land
rental rate rL. Capital depreciates at rate ±; ¯ 2 (0;1) is the consumers’ discount rate, and 1=Ã
gives the (constant) elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Together with the budget constraint,



















(RK;t+1 + 1 ¡ ±)
#
(5)
This equation is the standard one, except for the two price terms on the right-hand side (RHS) and
the population growth function gb;t that is exogenous to individual consumers (we specify this
function in more detail below). New-born individuals share equally in the existing capital stock.
Higher birth rates thus imply that this year’s investment must be distributed to a larger population
next year such that the individual return to investment is lower. Hence, a larger gb;t results in
relatively smaller investment today and therefore larger consumption expenditure et. If the price
of manufactured goods increases (in an expected way), consumption in the next period will be
more expensive. This raises consumption et today. The opposite is true if the price of capital pK
3In our model capital is the collection of varieties (machines). Thus, total capital K = kN is equal to the integral over
all capital varieties used in the economy. We provide a formal description of the capital stock below.
10is expected to increase – in this case investment is shifted from the future to the present, lowering
today’s consumption.
3.2 Production
Firms produce both capital and ﬁnal goods. The latter are either agricultural or manufactured, are
homogenous, and are produced under perfect competition. Capital is non-homogenous. It comes
in many varieties that are produced monopolistically subject to increasing returns. The efﬁciency
of production depends on the number of capital goods varieties. Free entry in the capital-goods
producing sector ensures that, in equilibrium, there are no proﬁts.
3.2.1 Final goods
Final sector ﬁrms use labor N, land L, and capital in the form of varieties j 2 [0;J] to produce











where AA is a productivity parameter in agriculture and ºA(j) is the amount of capital variety
j used for agricultural production in a representative ﬁnal sector ﬁrm. Productivity ﬂuctuates
over time: AA;t = ztAA;t, where the component zt represents a shock with mean one. The






. To capture the growth of agricultural productivity over the long term even before
the Industrial Revolution, we let the efﬁciency parameter grow at rate °A, such that AA;t+1 =
(1 + °A)AA;t. The shocks "t should be interpreted as caused by weather conditions rather than
changes in technology [as in Gilboy 1932].4 Production becomes more efﬁcient if more varieties
of capital goods j are available. These enter with the (constant) elasticity of substitution (1+²)=²,
where ² > 0. Land is a ﬁxed factor of production.











where AM is a productivity, and ºM(j) is the amount of capital variety j used to produce manu-
facturing output in a representative ﬁnal sector ﬁrm.5
4The abundance or shortage of seed as well as the effect of storage on price in periods following good or bad harvests
causes the autocorrelation of output. Cf. McCloskey and Nash (1984).
5Due to constant returns in ﬁnal production, we can assume without loss of generality that ﬁnal sector ﬁrms are
113.2.2 Capital
Technological progress takes the form of a growing variety of machines available for production.
There are j types of capital. Each of them allows a ﬁrm to perform a speciﬁc task. The more
specialized machinery is, the higher productivity in ﬁnal goods production.6 As the number of
varieties grows, machines that are better-suited to each production task become available.
Producers borrow capital from consumers, and pay interest at rate rK = RK ¡ ±. Producers
replace depreciated capital while production occurs.7 The price of a variety is p(j): There are
º(j) items of type j machines available. Representative ﬁnal sector ﬁrms then use ºA(j) and
ºM(j) machines of type j for food and manufacturing production, respectively. We assume that
the subset of varieties that break (depreciate) in a given period is the interval [(1 ¡ ±)J;J] of
capital varieties.8 The mass ±J of broken machines is replaced by producers while production
occurs.
To start production, capital variety producers need to pay up-front cost F. Capital variety
producer e | uses technology









e | ¡ F (8)
where AJ is a constant productivity parameter. Note that j refers to machines existing in a given
period, whereas e | stands for capital varieties that are currently produced as investment goods,
becoming available for production in the next period. Like ﬁnal sector ﬁrms, capital producers
proﬁt from a wider range of available capital inputs.9
Because of ﬁxed costs, each capital variety is produced by a single ﬁrm. Since capital varieties
are imperfect substitutes, their producers have monopolistic power. However, free market entry
identical and have mass one. Individual ﬁrms’ output, YA and YM, and factor inputs are then equal to aggregate output
and input in the ﬁnal sector. Thus, a ﬁnal sector ﬁrm represents aggregate ﬁnal production.
6In the symmetric equilibrium, ºM(j) = ¹ ºM;8j, and thus YM = AMJ´² (J¹ ºM)´ N
1¡´
M Consequently, for a
given amount of capital J¹ ºM, productivity is increasing in the number of available capital varieties J, and the extent of
this externality is given by ´². Similarly, for agriculture production, the extent of the externality is given by Á²
7This assumption becomes important in our simulation. It avoids that the capital stock falls until it ﬁnally reaches zero
when consumers live at the subsistence level for a long time (Malthusian trap).
8A simple way to motivate this assumption is to think of machines j 2 [0;J] as being ordered by age, with higher-
j subsets representing older machines. Due to their long use, or because of being incompatible with new machines,
the highest-j subset with mass ± breaks or becomes useless in each period, and is immediately repaired or replaced by
machines of equal quality. New machines ﬁll up the interval from below, increasing J, but leaving the age-ordering
unchanged.
9This extends the setup of standard models with a variety of intermediate inputs, where the variety production involves
labor only. We need the more complex setup to grant that both ﬁnal and capital goods productivity grow with the number
of available capital varieties. Otherwise, the relative price of investment would increase.
12impliesthateachproducerjustrecovershisunitcostandmakeszeroproﬁts. WeshowinAppendix
A.1 that in equilibrium each ﬁrm produces the same, ﬁxed amount of capital varieties, given by
F=². Increasinginvestmentleadstoanextensionoftherangeofcapitalvarieties, whileleavingthe
amount º(j) of each variety unchanged. This, together with symmetry in equilibrium, allows us
to derive a simpliﬁed aggregate externality representation of the model, where investment goods
are produced in the manufacturing sector.
3.3 Model Representation with Aggregate Externalities
We show in Appendix A.4 that the production side of our model can be simpliﬁed to a two-sector












where we introduced a more convenient notation for capital: KA ´ JºA and KM ´ JºM,
representing the capital used by a representative ﬁrm in the respective sector. Investment, i.e., new
capital varieties, are produced by the manufacturing sector, and the price of capital, pK, is equal
to the price of manufacturing output, pM.10 The productivity-enhancing effect of an increased
variety of capital inputs is obvious in these standard Cobb-Douglas production functions. For a
given J = K, the aggregate externality is the larger the larger the capital share (Á or ´) and the
larger ² (i.e., the smaller the elasticity of substitution among capital varieties).
3.4 Equilibrium and Industrialization
Equilibrium in our model is a sequence of factor prices, goods prices, and quantities that satisﬁes
the inter-temporal and intra-temporal optimization problems for consumers and ﬁrms.11 To ﬁx
ideas and show how industrialization happens in our model, we ﬁrst present a simulation without
consumption-dependent population dynamics. That is, we run our model with a positive constant
birth rate and without shocks, such that all individuals survive. The next section explores how
population dynamics – based on consumption-dependent fertility decisions and positive Malthu-
sian checks in crisis periods – modify our results.
10Since we have pK = pM in the simpliﬁed model, the price terms in the Euler Equation (5) simplify to
¡
pK;t+1=pK;t
¢Ã(1¡®)+®, where the exponent is always positive.
11A formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium is given in Appendix A.3.
133.4.1 Equilibrium and Industrialization without Population Dynamics
In this section we keep population growth constant in order to isolate the role of consumption
preferences (structural change) and aggregate capital externality. We show that even with this
reduced-form model we are able to replicate two important stylized facts of the Industrial Revo-
lution in England – the initially small, but accelerating growth of industry output and structural
change, i.e., an increasing share of industry in GDP. We simulate the model with a constant birth
rate, equal to the average rate in England 1700-1850, °b ´ gb ¡ 1 = 0:8%. In a non-stochastic
setup, these parameters grant that consumption never falls below subsistence such that all indi-
viduals survive. We thus have neither a preventive (via birth rates) nor a positive (via death rates)
Malthusian check. The corresponding results are shown in ﬁgure 1.
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Figure 1: Simulation Results with Constant Population Growth
Our simulation for England starts with the historical labor shares in agriculture and manu-
14facturing in 1700 (77% and 23%, respectively).12 Initially about half of manufacturing output
is produced to replace depreciated capital, with the other half being used for consumption. Con-
sumption exceeds the subsistence level so that °N = °b. Figure 1 shows that our model, even with
constant birth rates, replicates the low, increasing growth rates observed in 18th century England.
Growth is driven by the exogenous productivity progress in agriculture and by the endogenous
capital accumulation. Technological progress is fast enough to compensate the constant popula-
tion growth of 0.8%, so that p.c. income increases.13 Per capita consumption of agriculture grows
much slower than p.c. output of manufacturing. This is explained by two mechanisms: First,
as p.c. income grows, consumption expenditure shares shift from agriculture to manufacturing
(as shown in the lower right panel). Once this transition is completed, industry growth rates fall
but remain above those of agriculture, which is explained by the second mechanism: due to their
larger capital share, manufacturing ﬁrms proﬁt relatively more from the aggregate externality.
This is reﬂected in the upper right panel: Initially, agricultural and manufacturing TFP grow in
tandem – the larger growth rate of p.c. industry output is thus initially solely due to its increasing
demand share. When structural change is completed, TFP and all other growth rates stabilize at
constant levels, with manufacturing TFP augmenting faster then agricultural TFP. The investment
rate is low initially because p.c. consumption is close to subsistence. Investment then responds
positively to growing income and interest rates.14 Eventually, when p.c. consumption has grown
to a level well beyond subsistence and interest rates level off, investment rates stabilize at a higher
level.
3.4.2 Open Economy Considerations
So far, we have assumed that the UK was a closed economy, with domestic conditions driving
industrialization. Because of its role as a trading nation, this needs to be justiﬁed in the British
case. Before it started to manufacture cotton goods with new technology, for example, Britain
12We use the same parameter values as in the full, calibrated model. Our conclusions with regard to structural change
and the role of capital externalities are robust with respect to the choice of parameters.
13This would not be the case if birth rates were substantially larger, since then p.c. capital would diminish at a rate that
even the aggregate externality would not be able to compensate.
14Initially, the investment rate stagnates and even drops slightly. The intuition for this result derives from the Euler
Equation (5) and from our calibration of initial conditions for England in 1700. First, the relatively high °b = 0:8% (the
actual value in 1700 was close to zero, see ﬁgure 8) that we impose here decreases the per-capita net return to investment
relative to the initial conditions. Second, the aggregate externality begins to raise productivity, and thus income and
expenditure, only after the initial period. This effect is strong here because the high population growth rate implies fast
growth of aggregate capital. Both, the ﬁrst and the second effect decrease the right-hand-side of (5). Thus, the investment
rate falls initially. This is not the case in the ’full’ simulation with the English demographic regime, because there
population growth is lower initially.
15imported many of them from India.15 Eventually, Britain exported cotton goods and the like on a
grand scale. Traditional interpretations of the importance of demand have assigned an important
role to exports [Cole 1973, Gilboy 1932]. This could also affect the logic of our argument – in
some open economy models, lower initial agricultural productivity can increase the probability of
industrialization since wages (and thus, prices of exports) are lower [Matsuyama (1991)]. Here,
we discuss how adding foreign demand and supply would change our basic setup.
The fact that British industrialization in cotton textiles replaced exports from India as such
does not fundamentally alter our conclusions. Rising manufacturing productivity has two con-
sequences in the model: higher p.c. income and lower prices. Both increase the demand for
manufacturing output (the former through Engel’s Law). In an open-economy framework, the
price effect is even larger, because imports are replaced by home production and/or due to grow-
ing international demand. The falling relative price of manufacturing would also be expected to
result in growing food imports.
An open economy setup, especially for the 18th century, must take into account the high cost
of transportation. These made it (i) easier to replace the Indian competition in the UK and (ii)
isolated the Indian producers from UK competition for some of the time.16 Table 2 shows that
between 1750 and 1851, the share of exports - mainly of manufacturing products - in national
output grew from about 15% to 20%. As Mokyr [1977] stressed, there is no evidence that exports
grew sufﬁciently rapidly to kick-start industrialization. We conclude that our closed-economy
model can serve as a reasonable approximation.17
3.4.3 Population Dynamics
Having summarized the basic properties of the economy, we now add population dynamics. At
low levels of productivity, the economy is Malthusian. As agricultural productivity increases,
population expands. As land-labor ratios fall, living standards decline and return to their earlier
level. If times are bad, starvation can cause sharp declines in population size. We show how
certainfeaturesofthedemographicregimecanmaketheescapefromtheMalthusiantrappossible.
15In the 1750s, Indian cotton piece exports to Britain were ﬁve times higher than British exports. Exports from India to
Britain only collapsed after 1810 [Broadberry and Gupta (2005b), table 6].
16Initially, Indian exports become uncompetitive in Britain as the UK switches to industrialized production. Home
production in India remains competitive while transport costs raise the price of UK cotton goods there. Eventually, Indian
production of cotton goods for home demand falls as UK imports become cheaper due to falling transport cost [Broadberry
and Gupta (2005b)].
17Total output, Y , approximately quadrupled between 1750 (t=0) and 1850 (t=T) [Crafts 1985]. From simple growth













Y 0 ¡ (1 ¡ s0
E)
i
where the parentheses indicate output
growth due to exports and domestic demand, respectively. Let the share of exports grow from s0
E = 15% to sT
E = 20%,
as in table 2. Then, 78% of growth is due to domestic demand, while exports account only for 22%.
16Table 2: International Trade in England 1700-1850
Exports / Manufactures Exports / Food Imports /
Year Output Output Output
1750 14.6
¤ 11.0 4.5
1801 15.7 13.8 6.1
1831 14.3 13.0 3.9
1851 19.6 15.9 7.2
Source: Crafts (1985), Table 6.6 and 7.1. Authors’calculation assuming balanced trade. All numbers in per cent.
* Number for 1760.
Population N increases by a factor of gb(¢) at the end of each period:
N¤
t+1 = gbNt (11)
where N¤
t is the beginning-of-period population, whereas Nt stands for the population that sur-
vived period t. The exact growth factor depends on the demographic regime. At one extreme
(”high pressure regime”), we assume a constant birth rate gb. Here, population returns to equi-
librium after negative shocks through more deaths (e.g. Malthus’ positive check). Alternatively
(”low pressure regime”), the birth rate depends positively on real consumption, gb(ct).18 In this
way, population is balanced by the operation of both the positive and the preventive check.
We assume that, if consumption per head falls below c, only a subset of the population sur-
vives. The probability of survival depends on the severity of the nutrition crisis, measured by the












Withsevereharvestfailures, population falls, and starving individualsconsume their capital. They
die when they have exhausted it.19







= gbgs(ct) ¡ 1 (13)
where gb depends on ct or is a positive constant.
18Concretely, ct denotes per-capita consumption of agriculture and manufacturing goods, that is, ct = cA;t + cM;t.
19Diamond (2004) describes how the Norse colony in Greenland collapsed after years of worsening climatic conditions,
until farmers started to eat their calves and seed corn.
17The birth function gb(¢) is crucial for the escape from the Malthusian trap. If birth rates at
low levels of consumption are also low, and the response of births to improving conditions is
small, productivity growth can translate into growth of per-capita income (despite the fact that
population grows). This will be the case if gb(¢) is relatively ﬂat at c.
Where gb(¢) is a positive constant, escaping the Malthusian trap is nearly impossible. If the
constant birth rate gb exceeds productivity growth, resources are not sufﬁcient to nurture everyone
and the surviving population remains trapped at the subsistence level.20 We will from now on use
the full model, with population dynamics.
Next, we describe the economic effects of demographic interactions, contrasting the ”low
pressure” and the ”high pressure” regimes. In this setup, we show how fertility limitation helps
the escape from the Malthusian trap.
Figure 2 shows population growth as a function of capital per head (k) – in the left panel for
the low-pressure regime and in the right panel for the high-pressure regime. Capital stock per head
corresponds to a certain level of per capita income, given a certain level of TFP. As incomes and
consumption improve, birth rates °b increase in the low-pressure regime, while they are constant
in the high-pressure regime. Above point A, income rises with k such that death rates (given by
°b ¡ °N) dwindle to zero. The solid black line shows the gross rate of capital formation, inv=k,
where real investment is inv = (y ¡ e)=(pK).21 The growth rate of capital stock per capita is
given by the difference between inv=k and effective depreciation (± + °N). In equilibrium with
constant k, the capital-diluting effects of population growth and depreciation offset each other:
(± + °N)k = (y ¡ e)=pK.


































Figure 2: Population Dynamics for England and China
20In our calibrated model for China in 1700, for example, the constant birth rate is 4%, while deaths occur with rate
3.2%, implying a net population growth of 0.8% p.a.
21This is gross of depreciation.
18We begin by analyzing the low-pressure regime. To the left of point A, consumption is be-
low subsistence (c < c). Investment just replaces depreciation.22 Net population growth °N
is negative such that the increasing land-labor ratio implied by falling population ﬁnally drives
the economy back to an equilibrium at point A. At point A, consumption is at subsistence levels
(c = c); the birth rate is zero. Point A is an unstable equilibrium. For higher levels of k, incomes
improve and investment rises.23 Eventually, declining marginal returns to capital force down the
’inv/k’ curve. The new (stable) equilibrium is point B, which combines constant k and a growing
population.
In the high pressure regime, the economy behaves differently. The right panel of ﬁgure 2
depicts the interactions of demographic growth, investment, and output. For low levels of capital,
there is also starvation, as in England. Point A now is a stable equilibrium with c < c, and birth
rates that are offset by death rates. However, with capital slightly higher than at point A, death
rates fall quickly until the economy reaches point B. Now, death rates are zero, and demographic
growth becomes very fast. Consumers respond to this rapid growth by investing massively, in
order to ensure minimal consumption tomorrow. This explains the steep slope of the ’inv/k’ curve
totherightofpointB.However, despitesavingallincomeabovesubsistence, demographicgrowth
is too rapid – capital-labor ratios fall, driving the economy back to point A. If the economy reaches
point C, capital-labor ratios stabilize, as the capital stock expands at the same rate as population.
However, point C is not a stable equilibrium since a small negative shock will drive the economy
back to point A. To the right of C, investment falls rapidly, as declining marginal returns set,
which drives the economy back to C.
To capture one particular feature of the pre-modern world highlighted by Fogel (1994), we
also consider the economic contribution of the bottom 20% of the income distribution. According
to Fogel, in eighteenth-century France, the poorest 20% did not receive enough food to perform
more than a few hours of work a day. We model such an outcome by assuming that, if average
consumption falls below subsistence, members of the workforce that will die because of malnu-
trition will also not be able to work. This is clearly too optimistic – even without starvation, many
members of the workforce will be malnourished. When harvest failures occur, the effective work-
force will shrink – except in England, which provided generous support to the poor via outdoor
relief, especially during the years of high prices in the late eighteenth century.
Only the low pressure regime is likely to generate endogenous TFP growth. At point B in the
22This follows from our assumption that producers immediately replace depreciated capital varieties. Without this
assumption consumers would choose not to repair the capital stock and even consume out of it if consumption falls below
subsistence.
23This follows from our assumption of inﬁnitely-lived agents. It is equivalent to assuming that mortal agents at this
point produce exactly one surviving child each.
19low-pressure regime, total capital is growing with population. Because of the aggregate external-
ity, this generates TFP growth. In ﬁgure 2 this would be equivalent to a shift up and to the left of
the ’inv/k’ line – for any given capital stock, incomes are now higher. There is also an outward
shift of the birth schedule, since higher incomes stimulate higher birth rates and sustain a larger
population at the same p.c. capital level. The combined effect under our calibration leads to a
point B’ that is markedly higher, and further to the right – TFP growth produces a new equilib-
rium B’ that is more capital intensive, has higher incomes, and more rapid population growth.
This explains the gradual acceleration of growth rates in the low pressure regime.
In the high pressure regime, endogenous growth is not impossible but highly unlikely. Higher
TFP simply shifts the investment schedule to the left – for any given level of capital, potential
consumption is higher, but so is population growth. Higher productivity leads to a bigger pop-
ulation, with unchanged income at A. If the (constant) birth rate under the high-pressure regime
was low enough, growth could occur, because the investment schedule would eventually cross the
line given by ± + °N. This would create a stable equilibrium point C, similar to point B in the
low-pressure regime. The maximum rate of population increase that does not exhaust investment
possibilities varies with starting conditions. In our calibration, Britain could have sustained pop-
ulation growth rates of up to 3 percent because of its high initial income; China in 1700 could not
have coped with rates higher than 0.7 percent.
4 Calibration and Simulation Results
In this section we explain the calibration of our model, and simulate it with and without shocks to
agricultural productivity. We then derive the probability of industrialization in England, France,
and China. In addition, we illustrate what would have happened to the English economy had
it operated under a high-pressure demographic regime instead. Finally, we simulate the model
without the kind of redistribution that the Poor Law provided.
4.1 Calibration
We normalize initial population of England to unity (N0 = 1) and choose land L = 8 such
that its rental rate is 5%. We choose initial agricultural TFP and aggregate capital to match the
historical labor share in agriculture of 77% in 1700.24 Aggregate capital K inﬂuences TFP via
the externality. In order to identify the initial conditions for AA;0 and K0, we re-normalize the
production functions, dividing by K
Á²
0 in agriculture and by K
´²
0 in manufacturing. This means
24We derive this ﬁgure from Craft’s (1985) original numbers by leaving out other sectors than agriculture and manufac-
turing and re-normalizing the sum of these two sectors’ labor shares to unity.
20that the aggregate externality term has value one in the initial period.25 We choose AM such that
the price of manufacturing products is double the price of agriculture products, i.e., pM = 2.26
This procedure gives AA;0 = 0:523 and AM = 0:364. Given these parameters, we derive a
low level of capital, Kmin, at which consumption is at the subsistence level (c = c). Below this
level, only agricultural goods are consumed, and aggregate capital does not inﬂuence TFP. The
externality works only if K ¸ Kmin.27 In other words, it is not before the ”wave of gadgets”
[Ashton (1949)] arrives that the aggregate externality begins to matter quantitatively.
In the centuries before 1700, labor productivity grew at an average rate of 0.15% per year
(Galor 2005). Because agriculture was the dominant sector, we assume an exogenous growth rate
of TFP growth in the sector of °A = 0:15%.
The magnitude and persistence of shocks in the agricultural sector is derived from real wage
data for England, 1600-1780 [Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1997)]. With ﬁxed labor supply and agri-
culture the dominant sector, these productivity shocks have an immediate knock-on effect on real
wages in the economy. This is especially true since wages were largely ﬁxed in nominal terms,
and most of the variation in the Phelps-Brown/Hopkins wage series results from changes in agri-
cultural prices [Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1997)]. We therefore use the wage zt as an indicator of
the size of shocks. Figure 3 shows the real wage index and the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott–
trend.28
The magnitude of shocks is derived from analyzing the autocorrelation of wages. We estimate
lnzt = µlnzt¡1 + "t, which produces µ = 0:60 (t=10.15) and ¾" = 0:075. The autocorrelation
of shocks is high, and the series is volatile.
For the baseline model, we calibrate the parameters (¹, Á, ´, ²) to ﬁt average factor shares
for the period 1700-1850. In agriculture, we use ¹ = 0:4 for labor, Á = 0:25 for capital, and the
remaining 0:35 for land. This is similar to the 40-20-40 split suggested by Crafts (1985), and is
almost identical with the average in Stokey’s (2001) two calibrations. In manufacturing, we use a
capital share of ´ = 0:35.29
We normalize the minimum food consumption c to unity. For low income levels, equation
25This normalization does not change any of the features of our model. In fact, dividing K by K0 is equiv-
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26Different values of this parameter change our results only slightly. They do so at all because pM = pK, and a
different price of capital implies a different real capital stock.
27The aggregate externality thus takes on the values [maxf K
K0 ;
Kmin





28The standard deviation of real wages is very similar to the standard deviation of agricultural output in later years.
29Stokey (2001) uses a calibration for an energy-capital aggregate with the average share of 0.4.
21Figure 3: Real Wage Fluctuation and Trend
(2) implies that all expenditure goes to agriculture. With higher incomes, the expenditure share
converges to ®. We take expenditure data from Crafts (1985), using the same re-normalization
as for labor shares. The agriculture consumption share falls from 65% in the 18th to 30% at the
end of the 19th century. We thus use ® = 0:3. Next, we need to choose Ã, i.e., the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the literature, values between 1 and 4 have been used.
We employ Ã = 1, which implies log-utility, because this matches the elastic supply of savings
during the Industrial Revolution.30 In order to capture the low initial share of investment (4% in
1700, 6% in 1760, taken from Crafts 1985, table 4.1), we need a low discount factor, and use
¯ = 0:93 and depreciation rate ± = 0:02 .
The aggregate externality plays a central role in our model. The extent of the externality is
given by Á² in agriculture and by ´² in manufacturing production. In manufacturing, total factor
productivity is given by AM(K=K0)´², where the ﬁrst term and K0 are constant. Growth of
manufacturing TFP is
°T;M = ´² °K (14)
Total factor productivity in agriculture is determined by AA(K=K0)Á², where the ﬁrst term grows
at the exogenous rate °A:
°T;A = °A + Á² °K (15)
Crafts (1985) provides growth accounting ﬁgures for England, 1700-1860. We present the cor-
30The higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution implied by the smaller Ã means that consumers’ savings react more
elastically to changes in the interest rate. On the high elasticity of savings, see Allen (2005b).
22responding TFP and aggregate capital growth rates in Figure 3. If the aggregate externality link
from capital to TFP in our model represents historical facts, we would expect a linear relationship
between the growth rates of the two variables. Figure 4 lends some support to this supposition.31
Figure 4: Annual Growth Rates of TFP and Aggregate Capital
Average annual growth rates are °K = 1:17% and °T = 0:48% for capital and TFP, respec-
tively. There is no agreement in the literature as to whether productivity growth in agriculture
was faster, slower or equal to productivity growth in modern sectors. For example, Crafts (1985:
70-89) shows that productivity growth in agriculture was rapid, and in some periods surpassed
manufacturing productivity growth. We therefore assume that the growth of labor productivity
was broadly speaking the same in manufacturing and agriculture. Thus, aggregate TFP growth is
equal to sectoral TFP growth, and we can estimate the relationship (14) using the data represented
in ﬁgure 3. A weighted least-square estimation (with the length of periods serving as weights)
without constant yields the estimate b ´² = 0:44 (t=7.26).32 With ´ = 0:35, this implies ² = 1:25,
corresponding to an elasticity of substitution across capital varieties of 1.8. There is an easy way
to check the consistency of this calibration with other calibrated variables: we use the observed
°K and °T together with the calibrated °A, Á, and ² to check (15). The result is 0.51% on the
31Of course, we do not claim here that our model is the only explanation of the relationship observed in the growth
accounting data. In fact, the causality could also go the other way around – from exogenous TFP growth to capital
accumulation. However, what matters for our calibration is the linearity of the relationship, while we suppose the direction
of causality to be from K to TFP, along the main line of our argument relating to an increasing number of available capital
varieties.
32Another possibility is to take average values instead of running a regression. The result is very similar: °K=°T =
0.41.
23right-hand side, which corresponds well to °T = 0:48%.33 For the observed growth of aggregate
capital 1700-1860, our calibration thus implies very similar TFP growth rates in manufacturing
and agriculture, where the latter also includes an exogenous term.
Weemployabirthschedulegb(c)basedonthehistorically-observedco-movementwithwages
(cf. Figure A.1).34 It is derived from ﬁtting the empirical data with a spline regression, as de-
scribed in detail in Appendix A.7. For the demographic regime with positive Malthusian check,
gb is a constant equal to the net birth rate.
We summarize the calibration parameters in Table 3.
Table 3: Baseline Calibration
Symbol Interpretation Value
Parameters
® Agriculture expenditure share 0.3
¯ Consumer discount rate 0.93
Ã CRRA utility parameter 1
Á Capital share in agriculture 0.25
¹ Labor share in agriculture 0.4
´ Capital share in manufacturing 0.35
² Parameter for capital variety substitutability 1.25
c Subsistence food consumption 1
L Land 8
± Capital depreciation rate 0.02
°A Growth of agriculture technology 0.0015
µ Autocorrelation of shocks to agriculture 0.6
¾" Standard Deviation of shocks to agriculture 0.075
AM Manufacturing technology parameter 0.364
Initial Conditions
N0 Initial population 1
AA;0 Initial agriculture technology parameter 0.523
K0 Initial aggregate capital 1.67
Kmin Capital at which c = c 1.26
33Our choice of the capital shares Á and ´ is crucial for this result.
34We use the data from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1997).
244.2 The Industrial Revolution in England
How well does the calibrated version of our model ﬁt the historical data for England? We start
in 1700 and run the simulation for 150 years. Figure 5 compares the non-stochastic simulation
and historical facts. Over the period as a whole, population triples, while real per capita income
doubles – mainly due to the increase of manufacturing output. Importantly, growth rates of output
and TFP are initially low but increase over time. The model does well in capturing one of the key
characteristics highlighted by economic historians in recent years – the slow rate of productivity
and output growth (Crafts and Harley 1992). Also, output of agricultural products increases only
slightly in our model, in line with the historical record (Allen 1992, table 8.7).
The behavior of population and real manufacturing output is captured well by the model,
even if we overestimate the growth of the latter somewhat. Initially, investment mainly replaces
depreciated capital. Even with a low depreciation rate of ± = 0:02, this implies an investment
share of about 6%, which exceeds the historical estimate for 1700.35 Our simulation replicates
the rise of the investment rate during the following decades, but falls short of its full extent. One
possible reason is changes in ±: Depreciation rates may have increased over time because ma-
chines became increasingly complex and technological obsolesence rendered useable equipment
unproﬁtable. Real investment per capita grows by a factor of 3.5, which is accounted for by an
increasing investment rate, growing income, and a falling relative price of capital (dropping by
25%). Population growth peaks around 1820, which coincides with the historical facts. TFP in
agriculture and manufacturing is growing at similar rates.36 This is explained by the higher capital
share in manufacturing, so that this sector proﬁts relatively more from the increasing variety of
capital inputs as aggregate capital grows. Payments to land become less imporant in total output,
while capital and labor gain about 5% each. Stokey (2001) shows that labor and capital gained a
larger share of the pie, and that land lost about 10 percentage points of aggregate income – yet the
gains for capital in our model are somewhat smaller than the historical record suggests.
Employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing ﬁt the data well, while the model over-
estimates the income share of agriculture.37 One reason for this is hidden unemployment in agri-
culture – many workers in the English ﬁelds in 1700 may have added little to output. With the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution around 1780, many of these laborers migrated to the cities.
For these later years, the ﬁt with our model is markedly better. Finally, TFP growth in our simu-
35The corresponding equations are I = ±pKK and pKRKK = ¿Y , where ¿ is the aggregate capital share. For
¿ ' 0:3 and RK ' 0:1 (the approximate values in 1700) this yields I=Y = ± ¿=RK ' 0:06.
36Note that the former contains an exogenous component (°A = 0:15%).
37We derive the historical employment and income shares based on the numbers in Crafts (1985, p.62). We exclude the
service sector, renormalize the percentages and interpolate to ﬁnd the data for 1700 to 1860.
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Sources: Allen (1992), Crafts (1985), Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
Figure 5: Simulation and Data for England 1700-1850
lation ﬁts the actual data well.38
4.3 The Role of Chance
Adding shocks to our model produces a signiﬁcant dispersion of industrialization outcomes. It
also slows development on average. In the stochastic simulations, a negative shock lowers both
total income and investment. Moreover, large negative shocks lead to starvation and a net decline
of the population, reducing the scope for the capital externality to work its wonders. There is also
a second, more subtle effect: In the stochastic simulation, a positive shock to agricultural pro-
ductivity causes a surge in expenditure, and more demand for manufacturing goods. Investment
38The exception is the unusually low TFP in the late eighteenth century, when negative shocks such as the Napoleonic
Wars may have made a big difference (Williamson #, Temin and Voth #).
26increases. However, the positive shock to agricultural productivity also makes food much cheaper.
This produces an increase in the relative price of capital so that a given quantity of savings trans-
lates into relatively less capital accumulation. By contrast, in the deterministic simulation, the
relative price of capital (produced in manufacturing) does not change quickly.
Figure 6 shows the results of 1,000 model runs, starting with the parameters for 1700, and
simulating the model over 150 periods. The share of the workforce in manufacturing is our
indicator of industrialization. It varies substantially across simulations, and so does the growth
rate.
















Distribution of p.c. income growth for England 1700−1850




















Distribution of Manufacturing Labor Share in 1850
Non−stochastic simulation
Non−stochastic simulation
Historical value in 1700
Figure 6: Stochastic Simulation for England 1700-1850
The results lend support to Crafts’s (1977) argument that historical accident may have con-
tributed to England industrializing ﬁrst – the range of outcomes is very wide. Also, the actual
historical performance of the English economy is in the better half of possible results. Most likely,
England would have had markedly lower per capita income and experienced an even slower shift
out of agriculture – many simulation values for 1850 are as much as one third lower. What proba-
bly made a substantial difference was a run of good years in the 1740s, producing higher incomes.
This then led to higher demand for manufactured products [Gilboy 1932]. To our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst calibration exercise that demonstrates, based on a fully speciﬁed model, the extent to
which Britain’s industrial dominance in 1850 was the result of a lucky draw. Analogously, it
27could be argued that other, unmodelled factors – such as the Glorious Revolution’s strengthening
of property rights emphasized by North and Thomas (1972) – facilitated the acceleration of actual
growth compared to the predicted rate. If chance could have played a role in the absolute rate of
progress after 1700, it is natural to ask if it also played a role in determining which country got to
be the First Industrial Nation. This is what we examine next.
4.4 Probabilities of industrialization in other countries
Why did England industrialize ﬁrst? Could it have been France or China instead? In our model,
industrialization occurs stochastically, but initial income, inequality, and the demographic regime
are crucial determinants. Starting positions differed a good deal. We summarize some key vari-
ables in Table 4. England was both richer and more urbanized than France and China in 1700.
Table 4: Income, Urbanization and Population Growth in other Countries
p.c. income







Year 1700 1820 1700-1820 1820-1850 1700 1800 1700
England 1250 1706 0.76** 0.83 13.3 20.3 23
France 910 1135 0.31 0.51 9.2 8.8 16
China 600 600 0.85 0.26 6.0 3.8 10
Sources: Maddison (2003) for p.c. income and population growth; Vries (1984) and Rozman (1973) for urban shares.
*Manufacturing Labor Share. For England: Calculated from Crafts (1985), leaving out services. For France and China: Author’s calculation based on urban shares.
**1701-1751: 0.25%, from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981)
In order to compare England’s chances of industrialization in 1700 with those of other coun-
tries, we need detailed, reliable data on per capita incomes, birth rates, and income support. We
use the best historical data available, and calibrate with the ﬁgures summarized in Table 5. Agri-
cultural and non-agricultural labor shares in France and China are based on urban shares. We
assume that the British ratio of the urban share to total employment in manufacturing is indicative
of ratios elsewhere.
The birth rates for both France and China are constant. In the case of France, this is a sim-
pliﬁcation – population growth was low, and birth rates declined after 1800 in parallel with death
rates. Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) show that France had more of a ”high pressure” demographic
regime, with birth rates responding too little to avoid additional adjustment through the positive
check. We deliberately simplify to highlight the importance of the demographic regime, and as-
sume a constant birth rate to match observed population growth rates. For China, we also use









England 0.77 0.29% 0.29% 1.106 0.901 0.846
France 0.84 0.32% 0.32% 1.046 0.953 0.895
China 0.92 4.0% 0.80% 0.969 1.000 0.948
historical data on population growth. We observe maximum fertility rates in the period immedi-
ately before the demographic transition in China [Chesnais (1992)], which implies birth rates of
4% in our setup (with inﬁnitely-lived agents). We calibrate agricultural TFP to match the observed
agricultural labor share and population growth rates as closely as possible.39 Given TFP, we can
compute the implied consumption level relative to subsistence, and the shares of agriculture in
output and consumption. For China, we obtain c=c below 1, which corresponds to starvation of
part of the population such that °N < °b. Consumption shares for agriculture are consistently
higher than agriculture’s share in GDP because all investment is produced in the manufacturing
sector.40 Analogous to the British case, French shocks are derived from the movement of grain
wages [Labrousse et al. (1970)].41
For China, our simulations on average predict a decline in per capita income, combined with
a very low labor share in manufacturing. There are some cases of industrial development, but
they are rare and stop far short of the extent of industrialization witnessed in England. The pe-
riods of benign development result from a sequence of positive shocks, which leads to capital
accumulation outpacing demographic growth. As capital (and population) grows, the aggregate
externality pushes up TFP. Eventually, the investment schedule crosses the line deﬁned by ±+°N.
This makes industrial development feasible, and the economy reaches a stable equilibrium with
consumption levels higher than c.
France has markedly higher probabilities of industrializing than China. Its average share of
the labor force in manufacturing in our simulations is 36 percent – much less than Britain, but a
long way away from pre-industrial stagnation. Growth is markedly slower, at less than half the
British rate. The two distributions overlap to some extent. As Crafts (1977) argued, much of
the difference between the experience of France vs. England could be due to chance. Detailed
examinations of ”France’s failure” may have suffered from hindsight bias, ﬁnding causes where
39Deviations from historical values as given in table 5 are small. As in the English case, manufacturing TFP is chosen
such that pM = 2.
40China replaces depreciation even when c < c because we assume that ﬁrms repair capital while production occurs.
41We use ﬁgures for 1726-1792 and ﬁnd µ = 0:595 (t=5.71) and ¾" = 0:13.



























































































Figure 7: Stochastic Simulation for 1700-1850
there was simply bad luck.
HowimportantisredistributionforEngland’sbetterperformance? Wemodelthisbyassuming
that in the absence of redistribution, during crisis periods (c < c) the part of the population that
will starve also does not work [reﬂecting the basic insight from Fogel (1992)]. Adding this effect
to our simulations ampliﬁes the impact of negative shocks in the short run. Over the long run, it
hardly matters at all because higher land-labor ratios have a stabilizing inﬂuence. In China, the
absence of redistribution makes catastrophic declines of population and output more likely. As
noted by Lagerl¨ of (2006), these are a constant feature of the pre-industrial world.
4.5 Turning England into China
What was crucial about England’s starting conditions – its demographic regime, its favorable
income level, or the redistributive institutions that raised incomes for the bottom 40 percent of the
population?
First, we simulate the development of the British economy using historical starting levels for
capital stock, per capita income, and redistribution, but changing the birth rate to a constant 4%.
Immediately after introducing the Chinese demographic regime in England, individual consump-
tion declines to subsistence, so that all consumption expenditure goes to agriculture (cA=e = 1).
30The economy starts at point C (ﬁgure 2). Population grows very quickly because higher initial
incomes reduce death rates. Despite high savings rates, capital per capita declines. This pushes
the economy towards A. Combined with high birth rates, N increases by almost 50% within a
decade. Eventually, the economy reaches a stable equilibrium at point A, where the only demand
for manufactured goods comes from investment. Our results therefore suggest that, far from being
able to industrialize, England would have seen a collapse in living standards with a high-pressure
demographic regime.
What is the importance of starting conditions? Is a high starting point crucial for England’s
high chance to industrialize? We can repeat the simulation with Chinese starting conditions, but
an English demographic regime. In ﬁgure 2 (left panel), the inv/k curve is shifted down and to
the right. The economy at B will now grow more slowly as aggregate capital accumulation slows
to a crawl. In this case, living standards would have grown slowly, but would have eventually
approximated English conditions in 1700.
For our ﬁnal counterfactual, we examine the effects of redistribution. In our model, the Poor
Law is potentially important because it ensures that the malnourished can work even during years
with poor harvests.42 As it happens, British per capita incomes are too high even in 1700 for this
mechanism to make much of a difference. Very good outcomes – showing growth above 0.6%
p.a. – are much more common in the simulations with redistribution, but the average is basically
the same for stochastic simulations with and without the Poor Law.
Table 6: Counterfactual Simulations for Britain - Results for 1850
p.c. Income Growth Population Growth Labor Share in M
Baseline Model 0.49% 0.73% 54.2%
Chinese Demography -0.28% 3.07% 0.76%
Chinese Starting Levels 0.34% 0.57% 46.3%
Subsidies to the Poor* 0.34% 0.58% 47.4%
No Subsidies to the Poor* 0.33% 0.55% 46.8%
* Stochastic Simulations
5 Conclusions
42Previously, we presented the results for non-stochastic simulations. Since redistribution is important in crisis periods,
we now need to use stochastic simulations with and without subsidies to the poor.
31This paper offers quantitative answers to our two initial questions: ”why England?”, and ”why
Europe?” Based on a calibrated two-sector growth model with an aggregate capital externality,
we argue that Europe’s unique demographic regime ensured starting positions that made indus-
trial development possible. No lucky accident through a few good harvests, or as a result of
natural resource endowments, could have similarly raised the chances to industrialize. Nor could
redistribution, on its own, have had sufﬁciently benign effects.
We ﬁrst derive a model that focuses on the ﬁrst transition in uniﬁed growth theory – from
Malthusian stagnation to a post-Malthusian regime (Galor and Weil 2000, Galor 2005). The key
driving variable is not the generation of ideas through a link with population size or an unobserved
upward change in the population’s quality. Factors highlighted by historians of technology are the
importance of chance in new inventions, the role of tinkering, and the essentially non-economic
motives for adoption (Mokyr 1990). All of this suggests that the biggest single determinants of
technological progress was not the patent system, nor population size, but the size of the man-
ufacturing sector itself, and of the capital base installed. Interacting with the installed stock of
machinery created the opportunities for ”microinventions”, in Mokyr’s phrase.
England’s chances to make many microinventions were good mainly because of high per
capita incomes, resulting from fertility restriction. A more effective work force because of redis-
tributive institutions raised output and increased industrialization probabilities, but this channel’s
role was small. These conclusions follow from our simulations of England’s Industrial Revolu-
tion, which show a close ﬁt between historical fact and model output. We also show how impor-
tant it was that population growth accelerated in a context of high per capita incomes. Economic
historians have long puzzled over the fact that the country with the biggest population increase
between 1550 and 1800 also saw the biggest increase in per capita output (Wrigley 1988). In
our model, this is no accident, but arises naturally from the interaction of starting conditions, the
demographic regime, and the capital-use externality.
Based on the baseline simulation for England, we vary the parameter values to examine
France’sandChina’schancetodevelop. TheexercisesuggeststhatFrancehadreasonableprospects
to develop, too. The absence of the Poor Law and a more high-pressure demographic regime re-
duced its chances, but not to such an extent that history could not have played itself out differently.
The answer for China is fundamentally different. Because of the capital-diluting effects of rapid
population growth, its chances of industrializing are very small. Only very unlikely sequences of
good shocks could have given it a chance to develop.
Our results also highlight one mechanism through which inequality, even in the early stages of
development, can be growth-reducing – if nutrient availability overall is low enough, redistribu-
tion may create opportunities for growth because it increases the effectiveness of the workforce.
32This qualiﬁes the conclusions by Galor and Moav (2004), who argued that greater inequality is
beneﬁcial at a time when physical capital accumulation is crucial. However, over the long run,
redistribution is not crucial for industrialization.
Economic historians have sometimes been sceptical that endogenous growth models can cap-
ture the complexity of the historical industrialization experience. The inability of standard mod-
elling approaches to shed much light on cross-sectional differences proved crucial. Crafts (1995)
concluded that the contrasting experiences of France and England did not seem to ﬁt the mold of
earlier models, and that because of this, interpretations based on exogenous growth should be pre-
ferred. Our results demonstrate that more recent advances in uniﬁed growth theory can do much
to resolve seeming contradictions between the historical record and growth models. In particular,
the emphasis on capital accumulation and declining constraints on population growth during the
ﬁrst transition from stagnation to the post-Malthusian state prove useful. In this way, rigorous,
quantitative examinations of the cross-sectional differences in the industrialization process can
yield important conclusions about the nature of early development.
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39APPENDIX
Appendix A.1 – Optimization of Production
In this section of the appendix we derive the ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) for proﬁt-maximization
of the production side of the model and derive the demand function for capital varieties.
Final sector ﬁrms take input and output prices as given. A unit of capital variety j has value
p(j) and is borrowed at the gross interest rate RK. Labor and land are paid wage w and land









RKp(j)ºM(j)dj ¡ wNMg (17)
subject to the production functions (6) and (7). Capital producing ﬁrms take input prices as given
but set the price of their own output in order to maximize proﬁts. For given input prices, they




RKp(j)ºe |(j)dj + wNe | ¡ ¸e | [º(e |) ¡ º(e |)]g (18)
subject to the production function (8), where º(e |) is the targeted production amount of variety e |
and ¸e | is a Lagrange multiplier. In the following we derive the ﬁrst order conditions for problems
(16) - (18) and use them to obtain the demand function for capital varieties.
For agricultural output, equation (16) has the FOC
































The corresponding FOC for manufacturing production follow from (17)











M ; 8j (22)










40Finally, the cost-minimization problem (18) of a capital variety producer e | implies
RKp(j) = ´ ºe |(j)
¡ ²
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Note that we have not imposed symmetry of capital variety prices in any of these derivatives.
Rather, we will obtain symmetry in the following steps, which lead to the demand function for









































We will need labor demand Ne | as a function of a given amount of output of variety e |, ºe |, later













(ºe | + F) (29)
We then derive the demand for an existing variety j by a producer of a new variety e | by plugging
(27) into (26) and substituting Ne | from (29)
















(ºe | + F) (30)
We see that the demand for variety j by a producer of a new variety depends on the price of j
relative to the aggregate price index of capital varieties PJ. Note that ºe | denotes the amount of
the new variety e | that is actually produced, whereas ºe |(j) is the amount of an existing variety j
43In this step we implicity impose that the constraint in (18) holds with equality, i.e., production is at its efﬁciency
frontier.
41used in the corresponding production process. We can now derive the total cost of producing ºe |
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Marginal costs are the same for all capital variety producers e |, which is one of the steps in our
derivation of the symmetric equilibrium. We need two more ingredients to derive total demand
for variety j, ºd(j): the demand for j by agricultural and manufacturing production. Using the
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(ºe | + F) de | (36)
The ﬁrst two rows in (36) represent total demand for variety j from ﬁnal producers i 2 [0;1]
(i.e., from agriculture and manufacturing), and the last row is demand from currently active new
variety producers e | 2 [0; e J]. Note that the price of variety j enters © only through the aggregate
price index PJ, so that its effect on © is negligible. Consequently, © is treated as a constant in a
capital variety producer’s proﬁt maximizing price decision:
max
pe |





42where ºd(pe |) is the total demand for the new capital variety e |. Using (31), (32), and (35), we
obtain the proﬁt-maximizing price is a markup over marginal cost of production MC e J, which is
the same for each capital variety producer, so that the price of all newly produced capital varieties
in a given period is the same:
pe | = (1 + ²)MC e J ´ p e J; 8e | (38)
Free entry into the capital producing sector implies that each ﬁrm e | makes zero proﬁts, i.e., (37)




; 8e | (39)
That is, the amount of each newly produced capital variety, º(e |), is the same in a given period,
and moreover, is constant over time, even if factor prices and thus marginal costs change.
Appendix A.2 – Capital Varieties and Aggregate Capital
In the following we refer to aggregate capital as the collection of all machines available for pro-





where º(j) is the amount of capital variety j when it was produced (recall that this number does
not change over time as long as j does not depreciate – then º(j) becomes zero). We choose
the ﬁxed cost F such that F = ². Equation (39), and the fact that º(j) does not change until j
depreciates (and then becomes zero), imply:
º(e |) = º(j) = 1; 8e |;j (41)
Our choice of F greatly simpliﬁes the following analysis since it implies, together with (40), that
J = K (42)
that is, the total amount of capital in the economy is equal to the amount of capital varieties.
Moreover, newly produced capital is given by
R e J
0 º(e |)de | = e J. Consequently, e Jt denotes the
mass of capital variety producers as well as the number of varieties that are produced in period
t, but used for production only from the next period on. All existing varieties j 2 [0;Jt], on the
other hand, are used in the production process in period t. The law of motion for the aggregate
capital stock is thus equivalent to the law of motion of varieties, Jt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Jt + e Jt. The
mass of currently active capital variety producers can now easily be derived from total investment,




= Jt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Jt (43)
43Equation (38) implies that although the price of all newly produced capital varieties is the
same in a given period, it changes over time if marginal costs vary. For analytical convenience,
however, we want the price of all capital varieties (newly produced and existing ones) to be the
same in a given period, i.e., p e J;t = pJ;t = pK;t; 8t. We resolve this problem with the assumption
that owners of existing capital varieties exert the same market power as producers of new ones,
that is, all capital of variety j is owned by one individual or entity (although, of course, different
entities can own different varieties).44 The owner of an existing variety j chooses pj to maximize
pjºd(pj) subject to ºd · 1, since the amount owned of each j is one. Equation (35) with ² > 0
implies that revenue pjºd(pj) is decreasing in prices. Therefore, owners of existing varieties want
to charge the smallest possible price at which the constraint ºd · 1 holds. The constraint holds
with equality if pj = p e J. Intuitively, if the owner of an existing capital variety chooses a price
above p e J, demand is lower than unity and part of the variety is wasted. This is not optimal because
a marginal price decrease would raise the revenue and thus proﬁts. On the other hand, if pj < p e J,
demand is larger than unity and the ﬁxed supply of one unit is not sufﬁcient to satisfy demand.
Thus, the price of all, existing and new, capital varieties is the same within periods. We can now
deﬁne the price of capital pK:
p(e |) = p(j) ´ pK; 8e |;j (44)
Equation (41) establishes symmetry in capital producing sectors. In the following we slightly
abuse notation and use e J as the subscript for a representative new capital producer as well as
for the mass of all producers of new capital varieties. Because the mass of ﬁnal sector ﬁrms is
one, output (YA;YM) and factor inputs (Ni;L; and ºi(j) for i = A;M) of a representative ﬁnal
producer are equal to aggregate ﬁnal output and inputs. The price equality of capital varieties j
given in equation (44), plugged into (30), (33) and (34), implies that ﬁrms use the same amount
of each variety, i.e., ºi(j) = ºi; 8j and i = A;M; e J. Clearly, the total amount demanded of each
variety (i.e., the integral of ºi(j) over all producers i) is also equal for all j: º(j) = º. Market
clearing of each existing variety j then requires45
ºA + ºM + e Jº e J = º = 1 (45)
where the last equality follows from (41). At the aggregate level all capital, labor, and land are
used in each period. Integrating (45) over all existing varieties j 2 [0;J] yields
JºA + JºM + J e Jº e J = Jº = J = K (46)
44We noted before that existing capital varieties j 2 [0;J] are owned by consumers. Our assumption thus requires that
population N be a multiple of the measure of capital varieties J. To circumvent this problem we can assume that single
consumers bring their money to banks and that these act as proﬁt-maximizing owners of each capital variety.
45Recall that newly produced varieties are only used from the next period on, but existing varieties are used by the mass
e J of new varieties producers.
44Recalling that J = K, we can interpret ºA, ºM, and e Jº e J as the aggregate capital share in agri-
culture, manufacturing and capital production, respectively.
Appendix A.3 – Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions for single capital varieties and aggregate capital are given by (45)
and (46), respectively. The corresponding conditions for labor and land are:
NA + NM + e JN e J = N (47)
Z 1
0
Ldi = L (48)
where the latter condition is trivial because land is only used for agriculture by the [0;1] ﬁnal
sector ﬁrms. Regarding ﬁnal product markets, market clearing requires:
NcA = YA (49)
NcM = YM (50)
Before deﬁning the equilibrium, we need to introduce total nominal output Y , since this is the
basis for individual income y = Y=N that consumers consider in their intertemporal optimization
Y = YA + pMYM + pK e J (51)
where the last term represents the total value of newly produced capital varieties ( e Jº, with º = 1).
This equation, together with (43), J = K, and the condition that consumers’ budget constraints
hold with equality (YA + pMYM = eN), implies the law of motion for capital
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + (1=pK;t)(Yt ¡ etNt) (52)
that is taken into account in the intertemporal optimization (4) by individual consumers.46
Deﬁnition 1 Given initial values AA;0, N0, K0 =
R J0
0 º0(j)dj = J0 (since º0(j) = 1), and L,
a competitive equilibrium consists of sequences for t ¸ 0 of agricultural TFP, fAA;tg; prices,
fpM;t;pK;t;RK;t;rL;t;wtg; ﬁnalsectorﬁrmallocationsfYA;t;YM;t;ºA;t;ºM;t;NA;t;NM;t;Ltg,
capital sector ﬁrm allocations fºt;N e J;t;º e J;tg for all e | 2 [0; e Jt] producing at t; and household
allocations fcA;t;cM;tg such that (i) Given the sequence of prices, ﬁnal sector ﬁrm allocations
solve the problems speciﬁed in (16) and (17), and capital sector ﬁrm allocations solve (18); (ii)
Producers of new capital varieties charge the proﬁt-maximizing price given by (38), and, due to
46The term gtkt+1 in (4) results from the fact that individual consumers take population growth as given and consider
that each unit of capital will be divided among gtNt individuals in the next period.
45free entry, sell the amount given in (39) of each variety; (iii) Owners of existing capital varieties
charge the price given by (44); (iv) Given the sequence of prices, consumer allocations maximize
(1) subject to cA;t + pM;tcM;t · et, and consumer consumption expenditures et satisfy the Euler
Equation (5); (v) The market clearing conditions (45)-(50) hold; (vi) The law of motion of capi-
tal is given by (52); and (vii) In the model with Population dynamics, population growth follows
(11)-(13).
Appendix A.4 – Aggregate Externality Representation
In this section we utilize the symmetry of capital variety use in production to derive a simpliﬁed
representation of the model that provides two major advantages as compared to the general ver-
sion: First, the inﬂuence of aggregate externalities on productivity has an easy representation in
the production functions. Second, with a single assumption on TFP in capital variety production
we simplify the model such that variety production can be included in the manufacturing sector.
This simpliﬁes the system of equations that must be simulated to solve the model numerically.
Using ºi(j) = ºi;8j and i = A;M; e J in the production functions (6), (7), and (8), the
integral over all capital varieties j 2 [0;J] simpliﬁes to JÁ²(JºA)Á in agriculture, to J´²(JºM)´
in manufacturing, and J´²(Jº e J)´ in capital variety production. The terms in parentheses (Jºi)
represent the total capital used in ﬁrm i (i.e., the number of capital varieties multiplied by the
amount utilized of each variety). It is convenient to simplify notation and label these terms KA ´
JºA, KM ´ JºM, K e J ´ Jº e J, representing capital per ﬁrm in agricultural, manufacturing, and
variety production, respectively. We also use (42) and set J = K, that is, the number of available
















e J ¡ F = º; 8e | (55)
where Ne | = N e J; 8e | follows from variety output symmetry and (29).
In the following steps we will derive the TFP paramater A e J as a function of AM such that,
despite the ﬁxed cost in capital variety production (55), this sector’s output can be described
by the manufacturing production function (54). First, recall from (39) that each capital variety
producer’s output is F=². Second, we derive the labor and capital variety input needed to produce
F=² units of manufacturing output. Repeating steps (26) - (30) for the manufacturing sector and



























Third, we suppose that we want to produce F=² units of a new capital variety e | – that is, using the
capital variety technology (55) – with the labor and capital input given in (56) and (57) – i.e., the
inputs needed when applying the manufacturing technology.
F=²






Plugging in the corresponding inputs, i.e., (56) and (57) evaluated at YM = F=², this implies a
constraint on the ratio of A e J and AM:
A e J = (1 + ²)AM (59)
The price of capital varieties, as implied by (38), (32), and price symmetry, is then






















cost CM = wNM+RKKM from (56) and (57) and deriving it with respect to YM. Due to perfect
competition in ﬁnal production, the price of output equals marginal cost, i.e., pM = MCM.
Consequently, (60) implies p e J = pM, and, using (44) we obtain
pK = pM (61)
By choosing A e J according to (59), each capital variety producer uses exactly the amounts of labor
and capital inputs that a manufacturing ﬁrm would need in order to producer the same (ﬁxed)
output F=² and charges the same price that a manufacturing producer would request. Intuitively,
this result follows because the higher TFP in variety production exactly offsets the ﬁxed cost
F. We can thus incorporate the capital variety producing sector in the manufacturing sector. Two
remarksremain to bemade: First, the simpliﬁcationfollowsindependent ofour assumptionF = ²
that leads to (41). Second, increasing returns in variety production imply that the TFP advantage
A e J > AM, necessary to compensate for F, decreases with output º(e | ). It is therefore crucial
that each capital variety ﬁrm produces a constant amount of output, as is granted by (39), such
that the necessary TFP difference is the same for all variety producers and constant over time.
47In addition to consumers’ demand, Y d
M, manufacturing must also satisfy the demand for cap-
ital investment, as given by (43).47 Imposing market clearing, the total amount of manufacturing
supply, YM, must thus equal demand from households and capital investment (I=pK), where we
can use pK = pM:





The simpliﬁed model is thus equivalent to a two-sector model where capital investment goods are
produced in the manufacturing sector.
Appendix A.5 – Equilibrium Conditions of the 2-Sector Model
Having derived the two-sector version of the model in the previous section, we now present the
corresponding equilibrium conditions. The FOC for agriculture and manufacturing proﬁt maxi-
mization (19) - (23) can be easily simpliﬁed to their symmetric version by using ºi(j) = ºi;8j
and i = A;M; e J. The obtained FOC’s are the standard ones corresponding to proﬁt maximization
of (53) and (54). Factor payments to capital and labor are equal in both sectors, while land rents
are determined in agriculture:























Aggregate capital K and population N are given at the beginning of a period. In the following,
we take per-capita expenditure e as given and solve for the intratemporal equilibrium. From this
solution we obtain pM and RK, which we then use to solve the Euler Equation (5). Total demand
for agriculture products can be derived from (2): Y d
A = NcA = N [®e + (1 ¡ ®)c]. The remain-
ing expenditure goes to manufacturing, which implies Y d
M = NcM = N [(1 ¡ ®)(e ¡ c)=pM].
Total demand for manufacturing is given by (62). Markets clear for agriculture and manufacturing
output:















M = YM (67)
All land L is used and factor markets clear:
NA + NM = N (68)
KA + KM = K (69)
47Recall that the new capital produced in a given period is equal to
R e J
0 ºde | = e J since º = 1;8e |.
48Finally, total nominal output, as given in equation (51), now simpliﬁes to
Y = YA + pMYM (70)
This gives us a system 13 unknowns: Y , YA, YM, I, NA, NM, ,KA, KM, RK, rL, w, pM, pK;
and 13 equations: (61), (63), (68) - (70), and – each of the following counting twice – (64) - (67).
Population growth is then derived from (??), where c = cA + cM with cA = YA=N and cM =
(pMYM ¡ I)=(pMN). This system of equations characterizes the intratemporal equilibrium. We
use the corresponding solution to derive per-capita expenditures e from the Euler Equation in
the iterative process described in the next section.
Appendix A.6 – Numerical Simulations
In this section we outline the simulation of the equilibrium given in the previous section. Dividing











This condition, together with (66), gives a system of two equations with two unknowns, NA and
KA, that we solve numerically for given e. Given NA and KA, the remaining variables can be
derived analytically.
To solve the Euler Equation (5) we use policy function iteration where expenditure is a linear
function of the (given) per-capita capital at the beginning of a period:
e = 'k (72)
We discretize the shocks " to agricultural productivity using Gaussian quadrature with Q nodes
and corresponding weights !q, deﬁned by f"q;!qg
Q
q=1. We use a projection method to solve for
the coefﬁcient ', as described in the following steps:
1. Initialize by a guess '0 (a small positive number)
2. In iteration l, for 'l, calculate e according to (72)
3. For the given e, obtain y = Y=N, g, and pM = pK from the the intratemporal equilibrium
and calculate next period’s population N0 = gN









and calculate K0 = k0N0.
495. Evaluate next period’s consumption expenditure e0 = 'k0. At all Gaussian quadrature






A = (1 + °A)AA and lnz0
q = µlnz + "q
6. For the given N0, K0, e0, and A0
A;q obtain y0




K;q from the the
intratemporal equilibrium for q = 1;:::;Q





























8. Calculate e ' = e e=k
9. If k' ¡ e 'k < 10¡9, stop the iteration and accept ' as a solution. Otherwise use a Broyden
solver to update 'l+1 and go to step 2. Repeat until convergence.
Appendix A.7 – Calibration of the British Birth Function
In this section we describe the calibration of the birth rate function gb(c) from British historical
data, as shown in ﬁgure 8. What is crucial for our purposes is that in England, birth rates depended
positively on the wage. This is demonstrated by Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), Wrigley et al
(1997), and Kelly (2005). The exercise is similar in spirit to Hansen and Prescott (2002). We
use a spline regression, deﬁning x = w=w0, where w0 represents the wage in 1700. Population
growth, is yp(xt) = Nt+1=Nt ¡ 1. Let xpeak denote the cutoff-point at which the slope changes
its sign from positive to negative. We then deﬁne a dummy d = 1, whenever x · xpeak and zero,
else. Population growth in 1700 was close to zero; we thus impose yp(w0=w0) = yp(1) = 0. The
spline regression is
yp(x) = ¯1 [(x ¡ 1)d + (xpeak ¡ 1)(1 ¡ d)]
| {z }
x1




where u is an error term. When running this regression (without constant) we choose the cutoff-
point xpeak to maximize R2, and obtain b ¯1 = 0:0277 (t=8.03) and b ¯2 = ¡0:0016 (t=-3.39);
xpeak = 1:4; the adjusted R2 is 0.70. As in Hansen and Prescott (2002), we impose that de-
mographic growth rates cannot be negative because incomes are too high. The gb(¢) function for
England is then deﬁned by
g(x) =
(
b ¯1(x ¡ 1) + 1; if x · xpeak
maxfb ¯1(xpeak ¡ 1) + b ¯2(x ¡ xpeak);0 g + 1; else
(74)
50Figure 8: Population Growth and Wage in England
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